An Historical Analysis on the Origins of Aukus
Understanding the tripart military pact between Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom through the Advocacy Coalition Framework
Introduction
In March 2023, the Australian Government of Labor Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced its intentions to acquire nuclear-propelled submarines under a tripart military pact with the United Kingdom and the United States termed Aukus 1. At a price of $368 billion over the next three decades, the Aukus deal will be the most expensive defence acquisition in Australian history 2. Under Aukus, Australia plans to purchase three Virginia class nuclear-propelled submarines from the United States, before manufacturing a new fleet of five nuclear-propelled submarines domestically in conjunction with the United States and the United Kingdom, which will enter service in the 2040s 3. The Aukus deal originated within the Morrison government, following its abandonment of a contract with the French Naval Group to manufacture 12 diesel-electric submarines in Adelaide, initially slated to cost $90 billion 4. Though the Aukus submarine agreement has support from the Australian Labor Party and the Liberal-National Coalition 5, the inordinate price tag for the submarine acquisitions has generated discontent and confusion, with analysts, former politicians, and the general public questioning the necessity of the new vessels 6, 7, 8. The Aukus deal is the latest of Australia’s three major submarine acquisition projects – all of which involve technical disputes, multiple stakeholders acting at cross-purposes, and geopolitical considerations 9, 10, 11. Given the complexity of this policy area, it is surprising that neither the Albanese government nor the Morrison government provided an in-depth explanation or new defence white paper detailing the need to acquire nuclear-propelled, rather than diesel-electric, submarines. The opportunity costs associated with a project of this scale are enormous, and citizens looking to form an understanding and an opinion of the Aukus submarine deal ought to be aware of the beliefs of policymakers and the external factors that influence them, all within the proper historical and strategic context.
This paper will employ the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), a theory of policymaking established by Sabatier 12 and expounded upon by Sabatier and Weible 13, to analyse the decision-making processes surrounding Australian submarine acquisition projects since the Second World War. The ACF was designed to understand the behaviour of policymakers when dealing with wicked problems 14, which are novel policy problems that, due to their characteristics (i.e., high stakes and high costs), cannot be solved through trial and error, with there being no ultimate or immediate tests of success for solutions, as problems lack a ‘stopping rule’ (i.e., a state of equilibrium in which the problem is clearly solved) 15. Australian submarine acquisition, recently described as a wicked problem due to its high costs, lack of immediate tests for success, and lack of a stopping rule 16, 17, is thus a suitable topic to analyse via the ACF. The ACF is designed to analyse policy change over a decade or more, with its structure, displayed in figure 1, equipped to determine the operative factors in policy change over time 18. To appropriately contextualise the decision surrounding the Aukus deal, the latest policy outcome emerging from the naval defence policy subsystem (a policy subsystem being a specific policy area in which participants have influence and/or expertise) 19, this paper will analyse Australia’s two previous submarine acquisitions, the Oberon class and the Collins class fleets, allowing for comparisons that will reveal the operative factors in decision-making and the ways in which they have changed over time. The basic assumption of the ACF is that actors within a policy subsystem want to convert their beliefs into policy reality, and that they will amalgamate into coalitions based on these beliefs to exert a greater influence 20. The ACF explains the behaviour of actors within a policy subsystem, constrained and influenced by external systems factors, via a three-tiered belief system, relaxing the assumption that actors are rational and self-interested. The foundational level of this system is deep core beliefs, which are comprised of philosophical or value-based views (e.g., the relative importance of liberty and equality)21. The second level is policy core beliefs, which, informed by deep core beliefs, are defined as broad normative views about the fundamentals of public policy (e.g., the merits of market based vs. command economies, or how a nation ought to conduct foreign policy) 22. The third level consists of secondary policy beliefs, which are the most superficial level of belief and consist of views on a specific topic area (e.g., whether Australian submarines ought to be built domestically or not), which are less ingrained than deep core beliefs and are thus more susceptible to change 23.
External systems events/factors (see external events in figure 1) act to constrain or bolster actors and coalitions within a policy subsystem, and may include changes in public opinion, socio-economic conditions 25, or, in the context of submarine acquisitions, geopolitical or strategic factors. Unlike the relatively stable parameters which tend not to change, external systems events/factors are likely to change over a five- or ten-year period, creating an external perturbation or shock that alters the balance of power or parameters of debate within the policy subsystem (e.g., an election or a recession) 26. This is one of the main avenues by which major policy changes occur via the ACF, with the other being policy-oriented learning (i.e., enduring changes in beliefs brought about by new knowledge or experience) 27. Due to its structure, the ACF provides analysis at both a systems level and at the level of individual/group agency, which is appropriate for Australian submarine acquisition, a policy subsystem involving large-scale decisions, complexity, and many moving parts. This paper will demonstrate that the ACF is uniquely suited to an analysis of this policy area. The ultimate purpose of the ACF is to establish a relatively simple, accessible narrative in a complex policy environment 28.
Likewise, the purpose of this paper is to understand the Aukus deal by simplifying and making sense of the narrative of Australian submarine acquisition up to this point through the ACF. Thus, in keeping with the structure of the ACF, this paper will attempt to address the following questions: which beliefs are operative in the decision-making pertaining to Australian submarine acquisitions? And what are the external systems events/factors acting on this policy subsystem? The main belief that animates the pro-Aukus coalition, a group consisting of disparate actors across the political spectrum, is that Australia ought to coalesce into a values-based alliance with its traditional, Western allies to counter China’s nefarious influence, with the Aukus deal being a means to this end. The economic and military modernisation of China is the most important external systems factor acting upon this policy subsystem at present.
The Oberon Class Fleet
This section will comprise an overview of the acquisition of Australia’s first fleet of independently owned and operated submarines, the Oberon class fleet 29. The purpose of this is to establish the relatively stable parameters acting on the naval defence policy subsystem, as these will remain in play in subsequent submarine acquisition projects. Further, it is important to understand the external systems events/factors that acted upon policymakers at this time to then observe differences or similarities in future projects.
The most important external systems event/factor acting upon policymakers at this time was the Cold War. To bolster regional security, Australia signed a trilateral strategic partnership known as the Australia-New Zealand-Malaya arrangement (ANZAM) in 1949, a treaty in which Australia was assigned naval responsibilities including anti-submarine operations to protect shipping lanes in the event of regional or global conflict 30, 31. At this time, Australian defence planners were growing concerned about Indonesian, Chinese, and Soviet diesel-electric submarines operating in the region, as well as the possibility of a regional neighbour acquiring Soviet submarines with ballistic missile capabilities 32. The latest military orthodoxy dictated that submarines were the most effective anti-submarine weapon, with advanced navies (i.e., the British Royal Navy and the United States Navy) now considering submarines an essential tool in a balanced defence force following their notable efficacy in the Second World War 33. An island nation, Australia’s need for a submarine fleet was underscored by its geography, a stable parameter and basic attribute of this problem area 34. The Korean War and emerging bipolarity between the Communist East and the democratic West was also the impetus for the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security military treaty (ANZUS) in 1951, setting the stage for the next 70 years of Australia-United States relations 35.
Australia sought security from a power 15,000 kilometres away for two main reasons. Firstly, Australia and the United States share a cultural heritage, both springing from British colonialism, and share a strong inclination towards democratic institutions. Geographically and culturally isolated from the West in the Asia-Pacific, Anglo-Australia was yet to integrate itself in any meaningful way with its Asian neighbours, amongst whom communism was rapidly spreading 36. The second reason pertains to the beliefs of then Prime Minister Robert Menzies, a fervent opponent to communism elected in 1949 at the head of a Liberal-Country Party Coalition 37. A true believer in the battle against communism (i.e., a deep core belief), Menzies led Australia through the early-middle stages of the Cold War with ideological zeal, attempting to ban communist parties domestically and holding a referendum to that end, which was only narrowly defeated 38, indicating that public opinion (i.e., an external systems factor) was polarised on the issue. Australia’s total military expenditure was low throughout much of the Cold War, equalling approximately 2.5 – 3% of gross domestic product from 1949 to 1965, seeing a small spike to 3.84% at the height of the Vietnam War in 1968 39. This compares to 6% and 9% defence expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product for the United Kingdom and United States respectively over the same period 40. Though such low expenditure is incongruous with Menzies’ stated belief that global war with the Soviet Union was inevitable 41, 42, this is more likely indicative of the Menzies government’s contentment to be a junior partner to the United States in the event of war, rather than faltering belief in the cause 43. Owing to Menzies’ deep core beliefs about the peril of communism, and his policy core belief that Australia ought to contain it where it arises 44, 45, it is no surprise that the Menzies government tied Australia to the United States’ strategic objectives in Asia.
Within the Menzies cabinet, there were two main coalitions competing for supremacy over the broader defence acquisitions policy subsystem. John Gorton, then Minister for the Navy, represented the top naval officers and the Naval Board, and was opposed by his nominal superior, then Minister for Defence Athol Townley, who represented the interests of the air force in a clash of secondary policy beliefs regarding Australian defence strategy 46. Gorton, acting on behalf of the Naval Board, emerged victorious, having played an energetic and modernising role akin to Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty from 1911-1914 47, shoring up deficits in Australia’s naval capability by securing orders for four British-designed, diesel-electric Oberon class submarines in 1963 from the United Kingdom, which were to be manufactured in Scotland 48. The pro-navy coalition was likely buttressed by support from Menzies and the United States Navy. During the Cold War, the United States Navy preferred Australia to maintain a quiet, small submarine fleet to conduct reconnaissance operations in places inaccessible to their larger, more easily detectable nuclear-propelled submarines 49, and would have derived less benefit from Australian air force acquisitions. Menzies, an enthusiastic proponent of military cooperation with the United States 50, 51, likely joined Gorton’s pro-navy coalition for this reason. Foreshadowing Aukus, Australia cooperated with the United Kingdom in the manufacturing of the vessels, taking particular care to ensure that radio systems were suited to interoperability with the United States Navy 52. This saga demonstrates that the United States has a longstanding interest in Australian defence acquisitions for strategic purposes, and marks the beginning of Australian-owned submarines.
As early as 1959, an advocacy coalition, consisting of officials within the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the British Royal Navy, began promoting the idea that Australia ought to pivot to nuclear-propelled submarines in the near future 53, citing performance advantages over diesel-electric submarines (i.e., more speed, longer range, and a less frequent need to resurface as they do not use air for combustion/propulsion)54. This coalition secured funding for a joint feasibility study between the RAN and the British Royal Navy with respect to building a United States designed nuclear-propelled submarine, though the findings indicated that such a project would be too expensive for the time being 55. For now, the notion of sovereign defence capability (i.e., self-sufficiency in the production and operation of military technology), which will figure strongly in the Collins class case study, was not yet backed by an advocacy coalition 56, perhaps due to the external systems constrains imposed by a still-developing economy and manufacturing industry that lacked expertise in installing materials needed for submarines 57.
Australia acquired the Oberon class fleet in the context of the Cold War, the most important external systems factor operating on the defence policy subsystem at this time. The Cold War gave rise to ANZAM, a security treaty between local powers with British colonial roots, and ANZUS, a treaty that bound Australia to the United States’ strategic objectives in Asia 58, forming part of a larger, Western democratic coalition opposed to communism. Australia’s naval responsibilities under ANZAM 59, 60, and the utility of an Australian conventional submarine fleet to the United States 61, bolstered the pro-navy coalition in the Menzies government headed by John Gorton, leading to the acquisition of the Oberon fleet. The pro-navy coalition was likely influenced by concerns about Soviet, Chinese, and Indonesian submarines operating in the region, the latest thinking about the efficacy of submarines as anti-submarine weapons, and the importance of naval interoperability with the United States in the maritime environment of the Asia-Pacific during the Cold War 62.
The Collins Class Fleet
The section will provide an overview of Australia’s acquisition of the Collins class submarines, a fleet of six domestically manufactured diesel-electric vessels. Beginning with external systems factors acting upon the defence policy subsystem, this section will consist of an ACF analysis of decision-making pertaining to these submarines, including the beliefs and actions of the main coalitions. The purpose of this is to identify themes in external systems factors and the beliefs of coalitions which may be informative in understanding the Aukus submarine deal.
There were two main external systems factors acting upon the defence policy subsystem at this time, which served to bring about the Collins class project. The first of these was the economic environment. The newly elected Labor government under Bob Hawke inherited a sizeable budget deficit, high unemployment, and stagnant economic growth 63. A large capital works project like the manufacturing of the Collins vessels was therefore palatable to the public, as this served as an opportunity to create jobs, stimulate the economy, and to revitalise South Australia’s declining manufacturing industry 64. The second factor was the geopolitical environment. By 1983, when the Hawke government adopted the Collins project, the Cold War-era international bipolarity between the United States and the Soviet Union was in decline 65. This, combined with the social and political dissent stirred by Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War 66, was an external systems factor that clearly demarcated Australia’s strategic objectives in Asia from those of the United States for the first time since ANZUS 67. The divided public opinion over the Vietnam War 68, underscored by the defeat of the United States, relaxed the longstanding assumption that it is prudent for Australia to rely on its powerful allies for defence 69. This allowed an advocacy coalition centred on region-focussed sovereign defence to emerge in Australia.
The pro-Collins coalition was headed by the Hawke government and was bolstered by the leadership of the RAN, trade unions, and members of the Australian manufacturing industry 70. There were two main strains of belief embedded within the pro-Collins coalition. The first belief was that Australia ought to bolster its shipbuilding industry, both for the economic benefits that this would entail in terms of new jobs and economic growth (explaining the enthusiasm of trade unions and industry), and to increase Australia’s capacity to service its naval vessels across their lifetime 71. The RAN, in an example of policy-oriented learning (one of the main avenues of policy change via the ACF) 72, advocated for a domestically manufactured fleet of submarines as, over the lifespan of the Oberon class, there were disputes between the Department of Defence and the maintenance company, Vickers Cockatoo in Sydney, largely owing to cost escalations due to a lack of domestic expertise in submarine manufacturing 73.
The second strain of belief was the importance of self-reliance in defence, a central intellectual pillar of the Hawke government 74. The Hawke government believed that Australia ought to adopt a more independent defensive posture, separate from the United States, and saw the Collins class project as a means to this end 75, 76, and publicly declined to participate in several high-profile military development programs with the United States in the 1980s 77. Hawke was in some ways an intellectual successor to Gough Whitlam, who, in 1972, formally recognised communist China and established diplomatic relations and trade, some seven years before the United States. Hawke, like Whitlam and like his successor Paul Keating, argued that Australia should disentangle itself from the United States to make courageous, independent foreign policy decisions, and needed a sovereign defence capability to do so 78. Hawke and Keating’s enthusiasm for sovereign defence stemmed from their republicanism, and vision for the future in which Australia could be a great nation, embedded into Asia via trade, which would not be subservient to or reliant upon the great Western powers 79, 80. It was therefore necessary to demonstrate, through the Collins project, that Australia could defend itself without assistance from its allies.
Another belief animating the pro-Collins coalition was regional defence, a policy core belief explicated in a white paper entitled The Defence of Australia 1987 81. The purpose of the Australian Defence force, as per the 1987 white paper, was to deny foreign enemies the opportunity to invade the continent, and to disallow enemy operations in the ‘region of direct military interest’, an area encompassing the continent, territories, the Indonesian archipelago, New Zealand, and Australia’s immediate maritime approaches 82, 83. This belief, that Australia ought to focus on defending its local geographical neighbourhood, differs starkly from the Menzies government’s forward defence policy, in which Australia must work in conjunction with the United States to contain foreign threats 84, 85. Notably, China did not figure as a major strategic threat in either the 1987 defence white paper nor the 1986 strategic report that preceded it 86. Given this perspective on Australia’s defence, the pro-Collins coalition ruled out the need for certain warfighting vessels (e.g., air-craft carriers) 87, and favoured a conventional, rather than nuclear-propelled submarine, as the latter are generally too large to be suited to the region of direct military interest 88, 89. Consequently, the Hawke government set out to manufacture a fleet of six diesel-electric submarines, designed specifically to defend the region.
The anti-Collins coalition was principally comprised of members of the Liberal-National Party, and was motivated by the policy core belief that Australia ought to reemphasise its relationships with its traditional Anglo/Western allies in the United Kingdom and the United States 90, 91. This coalition was, at various points, strengthened by retired military officers, who, in conjunction with the Liberal-National Party, argued that the 1987 defence white paper was too isolationist 92, and opposed the Collins project as a manifestation of this strategic view 93. The anti-Collins coalition favoured the old policy of forward defence, which would be readopted by John Howard’s Liberal-National government in 1996 94. In fact, Howard’s views typify the beliefs of the anti-Collins coalition and, in some ways, serve as a precursor to the pro-Aukus coalition (which will be covered in detail in the next chapter). Howard, a conservative monarchist, largely rejected the notion of Australian integration into Asia, reasserting an Anglocentric Australian identity and promoting the importance of traditional, Western, democratic values 95, 96. It is this perspective, typified by Howard and central to the anti-Collins (or rather, pro-Western alliances) coalition, that motivated this coalition to reassert the importance of alliances with countries that have common values.
The anti-Collins coalition’s opposition to regional defence, and promotion of Australia’s relationships with the United Kingdom and the United States, is best exemplified by its critiques and behaviour in relation to the Collins project. The anti-Collins coalition took aim against the project in its procurement phase in 1985, with Liberal-National politicians and media pundits accusing the Hawke government of favouritism in choosing the Swedish Kockums company to manufacture the vessels, on the grounds that the Australian Labor Party and the incumbent Swedish Democratic Party shared ideological footing 97, 98. No evidence of corruption in procurement ever surfaced, with Yule and Woolner 99 speculating that media pundits and Liberal Party politicians, in a coalition formed on pro-British sentiment (contrasting with Hawke’s republicanism), were vying for the United Kingdom’s Vickers submarine to be chosen. Bolstered by the Liberal National Party victory in the 1996 federal election, the anti-Collins coalition, opposed to isolationist defence policy, sought to reemphasise Australia’s relationship with the United States. To accomplish this, the anti-Collins coalition capitalised on 1997 press reports purporting to be leaks about failings and manufacturing issues pertaining to the Collins submarines, prompting a parliamentary investigation, which determined that the leaks in question rehashed several manufacturing issues already being remedied by the consortium 100, 101. In March of 1999, then Minister for Defence John Moore commissioned a further inquiry into the failings of the Collins project 102. The resulting McIntosh Prescott report again rehashed manufacturing issues, making the incendiary (and ultimately false) claim that the vessels were still too loud, which was virulently contested by the consortium 103, 104. These hostile actions allowed the anti-Collins coalition to involve the United States Navy in manufacturing in 1999 to rectify supposed operational problems with the Collins vessels, thereby undermining the central idea of the pro-Collins coalition – self-reliance in defence 105. The anti-Collins coalition was intent on reestablishing forward defence and Anglocentric inter-naval cooperation, largely due to the conservative policy core belief that Australia should maintain its traditional identity and alliances.
The United States military apparatus is not a disinterested party here, and stood to benefit in several ways by augmenting the anti-Collins coalition. The United States Navy was interested in the Collins project from the outset, as it recognised the import of conventional submarines but was unable to secure congressional support for their construction due to the supremacy of the nuclear industry in the United States 106. The United States Navy’s involvement in the Collins project served as a platform to test their augmented combat systems, to strengthen the United States – Australian alliance, and to eventually gain access to smaller, conventional submarines to conduct operations unsuitable to their nuclear fleet 107. More broadly, the notion of isolationist, regional Australian defence (i.e., a motivator for the Collins project) was and is not suited to the United States’ strategic objectives in Asia, which includes defending Taiwan from Chinese aggression 108. Notably, the Howard government supported the United States’ decision to deploy aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait and sent a cabinet minister to Tawain in 1996, explicitly defending Taiwanese democracy 109, again exemplifying the importance of Western values to this coalition’s view of Australian identity.
The pro-Collins coalition advocated for a domestically manufactured submarine fleet, not only to promote the economy, but to establish a sovereign defence capability in Australia’s region of direct military interest 110, 111. The Collins project was a manifestation of the Hawke/Keating governments’ views on the importance of Australian strategic independence from its powerful allies 112, 113, 114, and was bolstered by external systems factors including the domestic economic environment and declining bipolarity as the Cold War neared its end 115. This rather novel set of circumstances, situated in the decline of the Soviet Union and prior to China’s exponential military build-up 116, saw sovereign defence become, albeit briefly, the prevailing belief within the Australian defence policy subsystem 117. Conversely, the anti-Collins coalition disparaged the project on the grounds that Australia should have a policy of forward defence, and ought to ally itself closely with Anglo/Western nations who share Australian values 118, 119. This coalition believed that the Collins project, and the idea of regional, sovereign defence that formed its rationale, was an unnecessary hindrance or divergence away from the goal of securing relations with the United Kingdom and the United States, nations with a similar cultural and political tradition. The pro-Aukus coalition, discussed in the next chapter, holds similar views to the anti-Collins coalition, and as will be discussed, opposition to these views is weak in the face of China’s rise.
Aukus
This section will consist of an ACF analysis of the Aukus submarine deal and the events that precipitated it, starting with an overview of the relevant external systems factors acting on the policy subsystem. Following this, the pro-Aukus coalition will be introduced, followed by a discussion of its members, their beliefs, and their actions, which will then be contrasted with the anti-Aukus coalition. This section will end with an ACF-informed conclusion regarding how and why the Aukus submarine deal came to be.
The most influential and enduring external systems factor acting on the defence policy subsystem in the two decades prior to Aukus is the economic and military modernisation of China. Policy actors’ perspectives on China’s rise, and what Australia ought to do in response, is a central question that divides actors into the pro-Aukus or anti-Aukus coalitions. China’s military expenditure has increased almost 30-fold since 1989, from $11 billion USD to nearly $300 billion in 2021 120. In 2011, China began to aggressively assert its territorial claims over the South China Sea, subsequently constructing military bases on artificial islands on the Sea and harassing foreign oil exploration vessels in the region 121. China continues to claim that Taiwan, which functions as an independent democracy, is a rebellious Chinese province, an attitude which bodes poorly for the stability of the region given China’s military expansion 122, 123. The United States recently abandoned their policy of strategic ambiguity with respect to a potential Chinese blockade or conquest of Taiwan, with President Joe Biden announcing that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defence in such an event 124. Tension between the United States and China over Taiwan is considered a possible flashpoint for a large-scale Pacific conflict or even nuclear war 125. This emerging global bipolarity, pitting the authoritarian states of China, Russia, and their vassal states (e.g., North Korea) against the United States and the other Western democracies has been termed Cold War II or the Second Cold War 126, 127. The notion that Australia ought to participate as it did in the first Cold War is a central idea of the pro-Aukus coalition.
The pro-Aukus coalition boasts such prominent figures as Tony Abbott, Kevin Rudd, Scott Morrison, Peter Dutton and, of course, Anthony Albanese 128, 129, 130, 131. Importantly, much of the Australian Labor Party and the Liberal-National Coalition belong in the pro-Aukus camp 132. Arguably, the governments of the United States and United Kingdom also rank as members. The main idea that binds these disparate actors across the political spectrum into a pro-Aukus coalition is a policy core belief, namely that Australia ought to counter Chinese aggression/expansion by coalescing into a large alliance with the other Western democracies. This is founded upon the assumption that China’s growth and aggression (specifically towards Taiwan) threatens stability in the region and is therefore counter to Australian interests. The idea that China does indeed pose a threat to Australia appears in the 2009 Defence White Paper 133 released by the Rudd government, the first Australian Government document since the Cold War to call for strategic changes in response to China, including doubling Australia’s conventional submarine fleet to 12 134. Though a series of external systems factors delayed decision-making with respect to this new acquisition project until after the 2013 federal election (i.e., the Global Financial Crisis, the expenses incurred by the Afghanistan War, and issues surrounding the Federal Budget during Gillard’s premiership) 135, 136, the Rudd government’s assessment of the strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific carried through to the Liberal-National government of Tony Abbott. The 2013 Defence White Paper 137 released by the Abbott government was remarkably congruent with the main pillars of its 2009 counterpart 138, in that it identified the China-United States relationship as determinative of stability in the region. The pro-Aukus coalition is not, however, simply intent on pragmatically securing Australian interests against a perceived hostile power in China – to this coalition, this is a values-based dispute, much like the first Cold War, in which Australia must stand against totalitarianism, and must do this by binding itself to the strategic objectives of the United States.
The values-based nature and strong pro-United States bent of this coalition is best demonstrated by an analysis of the events that led to the Aukus submarine deal. The first pivotal juncture came in 2014, when Abbott began pursuing a submarine acquisition deal with Japan in an attempt to bolster the trilateral security agreement between Australia, Japan, and the United States signed a decade earlier under Howard, emphasising the importance of Western/Australian values in the process 139, 140, 141. At this time, China was engaging Japan in an ongoing dispute about the sovereignty of several islands in the East China Sea (Senkaku and Diaoyu Islands), and opposed Japanese military modernisation 142. Abbott, despite acknowledging the utility of Australia’s trade-based relationship with China, enthusiastically attempted to purchase off-the-shelf Japanese submarines, lauded Japanese democracy, and denounced China’s policing of the South China Sea as a violation of the principle of freedom of navigation 143, 144. The Department of Defence opposed acquiring Japanese submarines, citing a preference for an evolved Collins or an entirely new design to be built in Adelaide, though Abbott ignored this advice 145, indicating that the capabilities of a submarine fleet were, in Abbott’s view, subservient to the broader strategic goal of strengthening the Australia-Japan-United States alliance. This notion, that submarine acquisitions are less about the capabilities or cost/benefit analyses pertinent to a new fleet, and more about securing alliances, will appear again with respect to Aukus. The Japanese deal never came to pass as Abbott was pressured by South Australian Liberals to open a competitive tendering process to choose a manufacturer to build the vessels in Adelaide, which drew bids from Japanese, German, and French companies 146, 147. In 2016, the Turnbull government announced that the French-designed Shortfin Barracuda was the best of the available options, signing an initial contract with Naval Group, the manufacturer, to begin the design and mobilisation phase for 12 electric-diesel submarines 148.
The second pivotal juncture, which demonstrates the values-based, pro-United States character of the pro-Aukus coalition, came in September of 2021, when the Morrison government abandoned the contract with Naval on grounds including delays, cost escalations, and diminished local input projections in manufacturing 149, 150, 151. The Morrison government and subsequently the Albanese government have cited the performance advantages held by nuclear-propelled submarines as opposed to conventional vessels to justify this decision, arguing that these advantages are needed in light of China’s military build-up 152, 153. However, the real answer lies elsewhere – the utility of the Aukus submarine deal is less in the acquisitions themselves, but in the broad alliance that it bolsters. France offered to sell Australia its newest nuclear-propelled submarines, delivered faster and at a lower price than the projected cost of the Aukus submarines 154. This would have satisfied the supposed need for nuclear-propelled submarines, rectified Morrison’s diplomatic blunder in offending France, and reduced the burden on the taxpayer. That this course was not taken would appear to indicate that the need for nuclear-propelled vessels was subservient to the goal of securing closer relations with the United States and the United Kingdom.
To understand why the pro-Aukus coalition sought a closer relationship with the United States and the United Kingdom at this time, the notion that a Second Cold War has begun is informative. Much like the ANZUS treaty in 1951, Aukus binds Australia to its Anglo/Western roots in a time of tension, uncertainty, and bipolarity, though this time Russia is the junior partner to China. Historian Niall Ferguson 155 draws parallels between the Korean War in 1950-1953 and the ongoing war in Ukraine, with the former being part of the impetus for the ANZUS treaty in 1951 156. Likewise, the war in Ukraine appears pivotal in explaining why the Albanese government committed Australia to Aukus. Albanese’s strong support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and substantial support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion (e.g., military equipment, expedited visa applications for Ukrainians, and significant financial assistance)157 is indicative of his belief (and by extension, his coalition’s view) that Australia should stand in solidarity with Westernised democracies against Russian and Chinese tyranny. Beijing certainly sees the Aukus deal as a descent into Cold War, with a Chinese Communist Party publication denouncing Morrison’s 2022 address to the Lowy Institute as an Iron Curtain-style speech, criticising Australian adherence to the United States’ strategic objectives and Morrison’s characterisation of China as authoritarian 158. To the pro-Aukus coalition, the present strategic environment bears remarkable similarities to the early years of the Cold War, and the Aukus pact and nuclear-propelled submarine deal is the method by which Australia is committing to the cause of Western democracy, much like the ANZUS treaty in 1951.
Australia’s recommitment to military cooperation with the United Kingdom is again indicative that the Aukus deal is less about securing Australia’s security through a practical alliance, and more about values. It makes practical sense for the pro-Aukus faction, convinced as it is that China threatens Australia, to seek a closer relationship with the United States, the world’s preeminent military power. However, the move to strengthen military ties with the United Kingdom appears somewhat impractical and anachronistic, given that the United Kingdom has arguably not ranked as a major strategic player since the Suez Crisis of 1956 159. Further, the United Kingdom is projected to have the worst performing economy over the next two years out of any country in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 160, making this nation a questionable choice for a partner in manufacturing expensive vessels. This alliance then is less about practicality and more about galvanising traditional Western allies with the same values.
Conversely, the anti-Aukus coalition is bound by support for an Australian sovereign defence capability. It consists of prominent individuals such as Paul Keating and Malcolm Turnbull 161, 162, and groups such as the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union within Labor Left 163. Keating and Turnbull have criticised the Aukus submarine deal on the grounds that Australia cannot operate nuclear-propelled submarines without nuclear materials and technical support from the United States, increasing Australia’s reliance on allies for defence rather than bolstering independence 164, 165, a concern echoed by the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union 166. In an NPC interview, Keating claimed that the Aukus nuclear-propelled submarines, far from a weapon of continental defence like the Collins vessels, would be compelled to adhere to the United States’ strategic objectives, which, he argues, include denying China a second-strike capability in the event of nuclear war 167. The notion that Australia’s sovereignty will be subordinated to the United States via the Aukus submarine deal is the principal idea that meshes these actors into an anti-Aukus coalition.
Keating and Turnbull’s distaste for Aukus also stems from a shared normative belief about Australia’s identity and place in the Asia-Pacific. Both staunch republicans, Keating and Turnbull believe that Australia should extricate itself from its colonial roots and establish its own unique national identity, with an Australian head of state, integrating with its Asian neighbours via trade 168, 169. Much like Keating, who declared Australia to be a part of Asia, Turnbull’s foreign policy outlook during his premiership was decidedly Asiatic, and emphasised the opportunities Australia might derive from partnerships with rising economies including Indonesia and India 170. The Aukus submarine deal, then, represents a backwards step, reinforcing a bond with the United Kingdom that Turnbull and Keating would rather see underemphasised in favour of closer ties with geographical neighbours.
The anti-Aukus coalition is far less influential than the pro-Aukus coalition in the defence policy subsystem for two main reasons. The first is obviously proximity to the levers of power – the most prominent members of the anti-Aukus coalition are not in Parliament and wield power only informally, whereas the pro-Aukus coalition dominates Parliament. The second reason is a lack of closeness and uniformity of message. For instance, Turnbull has called for Western democracies to galvanise in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, arguing that there will be consequences for the Asia-Pacific in general and Taiwan specifically if Authoritarian powers (i.e., Russia and China) go unchecked 171. Turnbull’s critique of Aukus is thus not out of step with the notion of a Second Cold War, and is instead centred on how Australia ought to participate whilst maintaining sovereignty. Keating, however, denies that there are parallels between Ukraine and Taiwan, rejects the notion that Taiwan is of strategic interest to Australia, and views China’s military build-up as a benign consequence of its economic growth 172. Other actors, including various environmental and anti-nuclear proliferation groups, have formed a disparate coalition based on environmental concerns about the nuclear materials needed to power the Aukus submarines 173, which Keating dismisses as a minor issue 174. This lack of closeness and disagreement with respect to the framing of the problem severely hampers the efficacy of the anti-Aukus coalition.
The external systems factors currently acting on the Australian defence policy subsystem are remarkably similar to those observed during the Oberon acquisitions. Specifically, there is an emerging bipolarity and tension between the West and a major Authoritarian power (i.e., China), a strategic environment analogous to the Cold War. In this time of strategic tension and uncertainty, underscored by the war in Ukraine and tensions over Taiwan, the pro-Aukus coalition has sought old, familiar allegiances with the United States and the United Kingdom. The pro-Aukus coalition consists of disparate actors across the political spectrum and is bound by the belief that China’s military buildup bodes poorly for the stability of the region, and that Australia ought to galvanise into a values-based alliance with the Western democracies to counter the nefarious influence of Chinese and Russian totalitarianism. Much like during the Cold War, Australia appears content to be the junior partner to the United States, given that the nuclear-propelled submarines do not have sovereign capability due to Australia’s non-existent nuclear industry. The anti-Aukus coalition, bound by a belief in the merits of an Australian sovereign defence capability, is hamstrung by a volatile strategic environment in a way that was not the case in the period of the Collins project.. The views of the anti-Aukus coalition in the present case converge on the benefits of sovereign defence, though they diverge significantly in other ways (e.g., whether China is a benign or malicious actor), which, combined with a lack of formal power, limits the influence of this coalition. Ultimately, Aukus is the product of the belief that Australia ought to stand with the West against China, even at the expense of sovereign defence.
Conclusion
The three case studies are linked by the ACF-informed revelation that certain coalitions are variously bolstered or suppressed within the naval policy subsystem depending on the geopolitical/strategic environment. In times of geopolitical tension, bipolarity, and uncertainty, the naval defence policy subsystem tends to be dominated by coalitions that favour close ties and inter-naval cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom. During the Cold War, Australian policymakers were concerned about the possibility of global armed conflict with the Soviet Union, and, during the Korean War, signed a security pact with the United States 175, 176. This contributed to the dominance of a pro-navy coalition within the Menzies government, which secured a joint manufacturing arrangement between the RAN and the British Royal Navy to acquire the Oberon vessels and took particular care to ensure interoperability with United States forces 177. Likewise, the current strategic environment, rendered potentially hostile by China’s military build-up and irredentism 178, 179, 180, has facilitated the dominance of a coalition that believes Australia ought to bind itself closely to the United States and the United Kingdom once more, resulting in the Aukus submarine deal. In a time of relatively low tension between the major powers (i.e., the waning stages of the Cold War) 181, a coalition intent on promoting Australian independence and sovereign defence dominated the subsystem, resulting in the Collins project 182, 183. A coalition with similar beliefs opposes Aukus presently, though is severely constrained by China’s rise, a factor that galvanises actors across party lines together into a pro-Aukus coalition. The Aukus nuclear-propelled submarine deal, as understood through the ACF, is the product of China’s irredentism and regional ambition as a strategic external systems factor, and the belief, held by the pro-Aukus coalition, that Australia ought to participate in a broad, Anglo/Western alliance to oppose Chinese totalitarianism, with Aukus being a means to this end.
The Aukus nuclear-propelled submarine deal, and, in fact, the history of Australian submarine policy in its entirety, is best explained by ACF dynamics. The ACF, uniquely suited to analyses of wicked problems 184, offers a relatively simple, coherent narrative of this complex policy area, which is characterised by high costs, lengthy commitments, a high degree of technicality, and high stakes in the domains of domestic politics, diplomacy, economics, and war 185, 186. The ACF, when applied to the Oberon, Collins, and Aukus acquisitions, demonstrates that decision-making is the product of competing advocacy coalitions, bound by policy core beliefs, which operate within a policy subsystem shaped by external systems factors, which are predominantly geopolitical or strategic in nature. In lieu of the ACF, a model of policy change that has explanatory power both at the level of vast impersonal forces (e.g., China’s rapid economic ascendency) and at the level of individuals and groups directly involved in decision-making (i.e., the various coalitions and their respective beliefs), it is unlikely that another model of policy change would prove an effective substitute.
Notes
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184. Sabatier and Weible, “Advocacy Coalition Framework,” 189-220.
185. Briggs, “Australian Submarine Capability.”
186. McCulloch, "Labor Lashes.”